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abstract: In this essay, I argue that the terms anarchia and anarchos had become 
associated with critiques of democracy before the final quarter of the fifth century BCE. 
I begin with a review of archaic and early classical uses of the term, with a particular 
focus on two instances in Aeschylus’ Oresteia. I then examine Euripides’ two uses of 
anarchia/anarchos, one in Hecuba and the other in Iphigenia at Aulis. In each case, 
we see that the concept of anarchic behavior is associated with democratic bodies; 
that charges of anarchia are laid by characters who engage with critiques of democ-
racy throughout the dramas; and that the term itself is embedded within discourses 
that are laden with the language and rhetoric of anti-democratic discourses found in 
Thucydides, Herodotus, and the Old Oligarch. Given that Euripidean references to 
anarchia are embedded within terminology that was already current in contemporary 
anti-democratic thought, I conclude that the concept of democracy’s ‘anarchic’ tenden-
cies had already been developed by the final quarter of the fifth century BCE.
keywords: Aeschylus; anarchy; anti-democratic rhetoric; democracy; Euripides – 
anarchia; democrazia; Eschilo; Euripide; retorica antidemocratica.
It has not been noticed that Euripides is the earliest author to invoke 
anarchy as a central argument against democracy – most scholars have 
suggested that Plato was the first to do so  1. But in fact, the manner in 
which Euripides handles the words anarchos and anarchia marks a radi-
cal shift in the meaning and application of these terms, and points to an 
early adoption of the notion of democratic ‘anarchy’. Prior to Euripides, 
anarchia had been used almost strictly to refer to instances in which there 
was a literal absence of leadership, or to specific acts or general attitudes 
of insubordination. In Euripides, however, we see the term posited as 
a characteristic of democratic political bodies. Moreover, Euripides 
 1 Gordon 2006, 86 traces the connection between democracy and anarchy back 
to Plato and Aristotle, while Schofield 2006, 130 argues that Plato’s «insight into the 
pluralism of democracy and its potential for anarchy generates a powerful and original 
piece of socio-political analysis» (for a fuller discussion, see pp. 117-121).
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embeds the term within discourses that are markedly and recognizably 
critical of democracy, and at times even oligarchic. This does not mean 
that Euripides himself coined the anti-democratic usage of the term, 
nor even that he endorsed those views  2. But the fact that he uses it in 
such rhetorically loaded contexts, and in such a casual manner, suggests 
that anarchia was already established as a code-word in anti-democratic 
discourse by the late fifth century BCE, anticipating by several decades 
Plato’s discussion in the Republic. 
1. archaic and classical definitions of «anarchia»  3
References to anarchia are rare in Greek literature prior to the fourth 
century. For the period before Euripides, the TLG finds only 10-12 
appearances of either anarchia or its cognate anarchos. These instances 
show that it was used primarily to refer to a literal «lack of a leader» 
(LSJ s.v. anarchia) or «a condition in which the magisterial offices of 
the government are vacant»  4. In the Catalogue of Ships, for example, 
Homer insists that Philoctetes’ men «were not anarchoi» (Il. II 726: οὐδ’ 
οἳ ἄναρχοι ἔσαν), since Medon had stepped up to fill in for the absent 
leader  5. Similarly, Herodotus uses anarchia only once, and to refer to a 
band of Persian cavalry whose leader has fallen in battle (Her. IX 23, 
2). More metaphorically, in Aeschylus’ Suppliants (905-906), the Herald 
of Aegyptus reassures the chorus of Danaides that they will not have 
to complain of living in anarchia, for in fact they will have many rulers 
(anaktes)  6. Outside of the literary realm, it was an Athenian custom to 
call periods without an eponymous Archon years of «anarchia»  7, and 
 2 For the sake of ease and variety, I use the terms ‘anti-democratic’ and ‘oligar-
chic’ more or less interchangeably in this paper. While this is to some extent an over-
simplification – not all anti-democratic thought was oligarchic, nor was all oligarchic 
discourse anti-democratic – I follow Raaflaub’s argument (1990, 38) that «democracy 
and oligarchy […] could be perceived [in the fifth century] as two mutually exclusive 
partisan forms of government».
 3 In delineating these definitions, I examine the usage of both anarchia and its 
cognate anarchos (i.e. that which is in a state of anarchia), and I limit my inquiry to 
sources that came before, during, or soon after Euripides’ lifetime.
 4 Ober 2008, 6. 
 5 Cf. also Hom. Il. II 703, in which Homer says precisely the same thing (οὐδ’ 
οἳ ἄναρχοι ἔσαν) about the Phylaceans. These are the only two instances in which the 
anarch- root appears in Homer.
 6 Along similar lines, cf. Aesop. Fab. 1, 3 and 44, 1. 
 7 See for example Arist. Ath. Pol. 13, 1. For a discussion of the nature of these 
«years of anarchia» in the early sixth century, see esp. Figueira 1984.
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by the end of the fifth century, this status could be applied even to the 
«absence of any properly constituted office»  8. Thus, despite the paucity 
of references in archaic and fifth-century sources, we may presume that 
the notion of institutional anarchia was nonetheless well established in 
the civic discourse of Euripides’ audiences.
As early as the mid-fifth century, we also see anarchia used to 
describe the failure or refusal to obey the laws or officers of the state, or 
a more general situation of «lawlessness»  9. The most famous example is 
Antigone’s burial of Polyneices, which is referred to as anarchia by Creon 
in Sophocles’ play (Soph. Ant. 672), and by Antigone herself in Aeschy-
lus’ Septem (1030)  10. Thucydides uses anarchia to describe the disorder 
of the Syracusan army during its first engagement with the Athenians (VI 
72, 4). Each of these anarchic moments (whether real or imagined) occur 
in direct opposition to the orders of some ruling party: Antigone violates 
Creon’s decree that no one should bury Polyneices, while the anarchia 
in Thucydides takes place on the battlefield, and concerns the soldiers’ 
response (or lack thereof) to their generals’ commands  11. Nevertheless, 
in none of the above cases is it in any way evident that anarchic behavior 
is intrinsically related to democracy.
Two further Aeschylean references to anarchia have been related to 
democratic contexts, albeit not securely. In Agamemnon, Clytemnestra 
claims that she has sent Orestes away out of fear that some «anarchia of 
popular clamor  12 might overthrow the boule¯» (Ag. 883-884: δημόθρους 
ἀναρ­χία / βουλὴν καταρρίψειεν). Aeschylus’ characteristic vagueness 
thwarts easy interpretation of these lines, but anarchia emerges as a type 
of violent disobedience towards the boule¯. And though it is not clear 
what this «boule¯» represents, Beer has speculated that it is a subtle refer-
ence to the council of the Areopagus, which was «in imminent danger 
of a new attack» by radical democratic reformers (hence δημόθρους 
ἀναρχία)  13. If this were the case, we would have a clear and early connec-
 8 As defined by Lane 2017, 64 (italics in original).
 9 This is the second definition provided by LSJ. Lane 2017 argues persuasively 
that the «lawlessness» of classical anarchia manifests itself strictly in relation to offices 
and officeholders.
 10 The passage in Septem was likely a fourth century interpolation, and the 
unknown author’s use of anarchia may – or may not – have been inspired by Sophocles. 
Cf. Hutchinson 1985, xliii on the later authorship of vv. 1005-1078, and p. 214 on the 
uncertain relationship between this use of anarchia and that of Sophocles. 
 11 I follow here in large part the arguments set forth by Lane 2017, 66.
 12 For the fundamentally untranslatable δημόθρους ἀναρχία, I use here a phrase 
suggested by Dodds 1973, 46.
 13 Beer 1981, 65.
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tion between anarchia and democracy, but in fact, there is little else in the 
text to suggest that Aeschylus is alluding to contemporary politics here  14. 
Nevertheless, given that the anarchia is described as δημόθρους (literally, 
‘de¯mos-uttered’), we may at least say with certainty that Clytemnestra sees 
this sort of anarchy as people acting en masse, or as a de¯mos. We thus see 
that by 458, Aeschylus can already use the terminology of anarchia to 
quickly suggest an idea of general and violent disobedience by a people 
within a polis.
Later in the trilogy, Athena advises the Athenians to honor that 
which is «neither anarchic nor despotic» (Eum. 696: τὸ μήτ’ ἄναρχον 
μήτε δεσποτούμενον)  15. While Athena does not specify what exactly she 
means by anarchos here, two things are explicit: it is a negative quality; 
and it is diametrically opposed to that which is «despotic» or tyrannical. 
Moreover, we may presume that the middle ground for which Athena 
advocates was in some way applicable to the Athenian democracy as it 
was constituted at that time  16. Beyond this, little is certain. Lane has 
posited that «to anarchon» is not tied to any specific political context, 
but rather suggests «an absence of obedience to ruling officials»  17. Marr 
reads these lines in the light of contemporary constitutional debates, with 
anarchia again representing the most «radical» democratic reforms that 
were (potentially) being proposed  18. Dover, conversely, seems to take it 
for granted that Aeschylus was already using «to anarchon» as shorthand 
for «the oligarch’s description of democracy», but without elaborating 
further, nor providing any point of comparison besides Plato  19. None 
of these interpretations are mutually exclusive, nor are they exhaustive; 
perhaps most importantly, each one is far from secure. The crucial point, 
however, is that the Aeschylean evidence is insufficient to prove with any 
certainty that ‘democratic anarchia’ was already current as a concept or 
code-word in anti-democratic discourse in the middle of the fifth cen-
 14 And indeed most others have avoided ascribing to this boule¯ any specific refer-
ence to the Athenian institution, cf. e.g. Fartzoff 2017, 220 and Lane 2017, 66. 
 15 The chorus uses essentially the same formulation earlier in the play (Eum. 526-
528), albeit in a less encouraging fashion.
 16 Dover 1957, 233-235; Jones 1987, 75.
 17 Lane 2017, 67. Accordingly, «tyranny is a kind of excrescence of ruling author-
ity».
 18 See Marr 1993, esp. 15-16. Dodds 1973 discusses the contemporary political 
context of the Eumenides more broadly, though not this specific line.
 19 Dover 1957, 233. Dover seems to take it for granted that «anarchia» was already 
uses as a critique of democracy in Aeschylus’ age, but he cites only Plato in conjunction 
with this statement, and he makes no further comment on the matter.
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tury. What we can see, however, is that the seeds for a politicized and 
partisan use of the term had at least been planted.  
2. «anarchia» among the achaeans:
 the cases of euripidean anarchy
In the entire Euripidean corpus, anarchia/anarchos can be found in only 
two instances, once in Hecuba (c. 424/3 BCE), and once in Iphigenia at 
Aulis (405 BCE). Given the rarity of the terminology, and the twenty 
years that separate its two appearances, it is surprising that the cases 
share so much in common: in both Hecuba and Iphigenia at Aulis, the 
accusations of anarchy are directed at the Achaean army; in each tragedy, 
the army had already been depicted as a democratic body, and at the 
very moment it is said to be anarchic, it is further specified that it is a 
naval army; and in both instances, the references to anarchia fall within a 
constellation of language or concepts that were typical of contemporary 
critiques of democracy. While the sample size is admittedly small, the 
striking similarities between Euripides’ two uses of the term, and indeed 
the brevity with which he is able to make the point, suggest that he is 
drawing on a pre-existing concept of anarchia that saw it as a disorder of 
democratic societies. 
I begin by discussing the similarities in context shared by Hecuba and 
IA, after which I examine each instance of Euripidean anarchia singly, 
focusing first on elements of the speakers’ backgrounds, and then on 
the specific passages, that recall anti-democratic discourses. Both plays 
are set within the context of an Achaean military camp – what David 
Carter calls «the polis’ military analogue»  20 – and in each case Euripi-
des goes out of his way to paint the processes of these military camps as 
democratic. In Hecuba, we see early on, and at length, that the Achaeans 
decide to sacrifice Hecuba’s daughter Polyxena by voting in what is 
undeniably a democratic «assembly» (Hec. 107: πλήρει ξυνόδῳ): differ-
ent speakers take turns presenting different stances on the issue to the 
army, whose vote (cf. Hec. 196: ψήφῳ) is decisive  21. Similarly, in IA we 
learn that the common soldiers (the mesos) have chosen Agamemnon as 
their general after he had conducted a veritable political campaign to win 
 20 Carter 2010, 49.
 21 For more on this scene and its democratic nature, see Carter 2013, 34-39. For a 
broader discussion of the democratic and «collectivist» nature of the Achaean army in 
Hecuba, and its importance for the framework of the play, see Kovacs 1987, 81-83.
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that role (cf. IA 337-342), a process that would have been familiar to the 
Athenian audience  22. In other words, in both Hecuba and Iphigenia at 
Aulis, Euripides ostentatiously replaces Homer’s strict military hierarchy 
with an army that is fundamentally democratic.
3. anarchia in «hecuba»
Upon hearing the report of Polyxena’s sacrifice, Hecuba expresses 
concern for the safety of her daughter’s corpse amidst an Achaean army 
with a penchant for anarchy. Just before she lays this charge, however, 
Hecuba emphasizes her particular worldview (Hec. 596-598): 
ὁ­μὲν­πονηρὸς­οὐδὲν­ἄλλο­πλὴν­κακός,
ὁ­δ’­ἐσθλὸς­ἐσθλὸς­οὐδὲ­συμφορᾶς­ὕπο
φύσιν­διέφθειρ’­ἀλλὰ­χρηστός­ἐστ’­ἀεί
the worthless man is nothing if not bad,
the noble man is noble and always good;
his nature does not wilt when bad luck strikes  23
Here, Hecuba is trying to make sense of Polyxena’s tremendous courage 
in the face of death, and to do so she directly relates the ‘nobility’ of 
Polyxena’s behavior to that of her background. Moreover, she does so 
using specialized and indeed contentious vocabulary. The esthlos/kakos 
dichotomy had long been a hallmark of aristocratic discourse, with the 
two terms assuming connotations of both status (esthlos being aristo-
cratic, kakos being lower-class) and moral value (esthlos being ‘good’; 
kakos meaning ‘bad’)  24. By the time of Hecuba, the terms had become 
the subject of some debate: in Euripides’ Electra (c. 420) for example, a 
character directly refutes the traditional links between class and moral 
status by stating that «there are many of noble birth who are kakoi»  25. 
Given her own status, it is implicit that Hecuba sees class and morality 
 22 We know all too little about how Athenian strate¯goi were chosen, beyond the 
fact that they were elected by the people annually. On the question in general, cf. Pié-
rart 1974, Rhodes 1981, and Hamel 1998, 14-23. Regarding the possibility that Atheni-
ans held special elections in which they would choose one or more generals for specific 
expeditions, cf. IG I3 93b 2-3 (= Meiggs - Lewis 78b; cited by Rhodes 1981, 130), and 
Hamel 1998, 15-19. 
 23 Unless otherwise noted, all Greek texts are taken from editions of Oxford Clas-
sical Texts, and all translations are by author.
 24 See esp. Cerri 1968 for a full analysis of these terms in Theognis and Pindar.
 25 Eur. El. 551: πολλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες εὐγενεῖς εἰσιν κακοί. See Donlan 1978, 102 on this 
passage, and passim on the evolution of «social vocabulary» in late fifth-century Athens.
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as linked, but this is confirmed just a few lines later, when she avows 
that «noble upbringing contains the instruction of goodness [esthlou]»  26. 
Implicit in that reasoning, but explicit in the passage quoted above, is 
that the masses are of dubious ethical and moral quality. The fact that 
Hecuba’s worldview is aristocratic becomes, at this point, quite obvi-
ous  27. 
And it is at this very point that Hecuba raises her fear about the 
potential for anarchia among the Achaeans (Hec. 604-608): 
σὺ­δ’­ἐλθὲ­καὶ­σήμηνον­Ἀργείοις­τάδε,
μὴ­θιγγάνειν­μοι­μηδέν’­ἀλλ’­εἴργειν­ὄχλον
τῆς­παιδός.­ἔν­τοι­μυρίῳ­στρατεύματι
ἀκόλαστος­ὄχλος­ναυτική­τ’­ἀναρχία
κρείσσων­πυρός,­κακὸς­δ’­ὁ­μή­τι­δρῶν­κακόν.
You then [Talthybius], go tell the Argives this:
no one is to touch her, and keep the mob away
from my daughter. For within a massive army
the mob is unbridled, the anarchia of sailors
greater than fire, and evil is he who does no evil.
Despite Talthybius’ insistence that the Achaean army is essentially 
according Polyxena a hero’s burial (Hec. 571-580)  28, Hecuba is clearly 
concerned that her daughter’s corpse will be violated. As Michelini 
argues, this could be understood as a reaction to the highly eroticized 
description of Polyxena’s death that Hecuba (and the audience) had just 
heard  29. But Hecuba does not articulate her fear in relation to the specif-
ics that she has learned from Talthybius, but rather as a general concern 
that the mass of the army is incapable of behaving properly. In other 
words, very little within the text justifies this claim on Hecuba’s part, and 
 26 Hec. 600-601: ἔχει γε μέντοι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς / δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ.
 27 On this passage, see also Kovacs 1987, 97-98 and Stanton 1995, 15, who calls 
this «as bold a claim as one could seek that birth into a noble family should be expected 
to produce morally admirable behavior». On Hecuba’s aristocratic ideals more gener-
ally, see Stanton 1995; Battezzato 2018, 9-14.
 28 On the burial, see Kovacs 1987, 97 and Gregory 1999, 114-115.
 29 Michelini 1987, 166-168. Contra see Kovacs 1987, 98, who merely notes that 
this «suspicion seems unjust, the less attractive side of [her] aristocratic code». Follow-
ing Page 1934, 67, Mossman 1995, 246 actually argues for interpolation on the basis of 
this seemingly paradoxical statement. But this ignores the fact that Hecuba’s characteri-
zation of the army here is entirely in keeping with the manner in which she understands 
the dynamics of power to function among the Achaeans, and that she makes remarks of 
a similar nature later in the play, esp. at 864-869 (discussed below).
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it appears to be the result of pure bias on her part  30: as with her analysis 
of Polyxena’s nobility, the general perspective in which Hecuba’s anar­
chia is rooted is one that is hostile to the lower classes. 
Moreover, Euripides signals that her notion of anarchia is not simply 
the product of an aristocratic viewpoint, but indeed an anti-democratic 
one, for he surrounds the term with very specific, and in some cases 
coded, language. Most obviously, Hecuba lends a veneer of democracy 
to the unruliness of the Achaean army by specifying that their anarchia is 
nautike¯ – related to the fact they are sailors. Regardless of how we under-
stand the connection between the development of Athenian democracy 
and the increasing stature of the navy in the early fifth century  31, it is 
clear that at least some of Euripides’ contemporaries  32 considered there 
to be a strong link (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1, 2):
πρῶτον­μὲν­οὖν­τοῦτο­ἐρῶ,­ὅτι­δίκαιοι­αὐτόθι­καὶ­οἱ­πένητες­καὶ­ὁ­δῆμος­πλέον­
ἔχειν­τῶν­γενναίων­καὶ­τῶν­πλουσίων­διὰ­τόδε,­ὅτι­ὁ­δῆμός­ἐστιν­ὁ­ἐλαύνων­
τὰς­ναῦς­καὶ­ὁ­τὴν­δύναμιν­περιτιθεὶς­τῇ­πόλει.  33
First then I’ll say this – that both the poor and the de¯mos justifiably have 
more [at Athens] than the well-born and rich, for this reason: because it is 
the de¯mos that works the ships and bestows power on the city. 
The Old Oligarch is by no means a reliable reporter of prevailing senti-
ments in democratic Athens, but the controversial aspect of this state-
ment is not that there is a relationship between the Athenian democracy 
and the naval manpower required to maintain the empire, but rather 
 30 Indeed, as numerous commentators have noted, Hecuba is essentially voicing 
standard oligarchic complaints about the «indiscipline of the masses». Cf. Collard 1991, 
163 (quoted here), but also Gregory 1999, 119 and Battezzato 2018, 153.
 31 For different views on the precise nature of this connection, see Ober 2007, 
99-101, Raaflaub 2007, 121-123 and (arguing against the existence of a historical rela-
tionship) Ceccarelli 1993. The lines of the debate generally revolve not only around 
whether a relationship existed between the expansion of the Athenian navy and the rise 
of democracy, but also whether the increasing importance of the navy had a causative 
effect on the advent of democracy, and to what extent. 
 32 A vast range of dates has been proposed for the Old Oligarch, but most fall 
within the second half of the fifth century BCE, an assessment with which I agree. For 
overviews of the question (and the answers provided), see Marr - Rhodes 2008, 3-6 and 
31-32, and Tuci 2011, 35-41. For lengthier discussions, cf. Treu 1967, 1947-1959, For-
rest 1970, and Tuci 2011, who establishes strong arguments in favor of a date between 
425 and 413. Contra see for example Hornblower 2000, who argues that the document 
was in fact composed in the fourth century BCE by an author masquerading as a fifth-
century oligarchic sympathizer. But even Hornblower’s minority view would still sug-
gest that fifth-century Athenians saw a connection between the navy and the existence 
of democracy, at least presuming that the impersonation was a competent one. 
 33 I follow here the text printed in Marr - Rhodes 2008. 
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that this relationship ‘justifies’ the hegemony of the de¯mos  34. Thus, it is 
likely that the navy and democracy were commonly seen as intrinsically 
connected, an inference that is further warranted by Aristotle’s repeated 
affirmation of the concept  35. Hecuba’s qualification of the Achaean 
army’s anarchia as «nautike¯» thus reminds the audience of its democratic 
constitution, and is a subtle suggestion that the soldiers’ potential for 
unruly behavior is rooted therein.
In fact, Hecuba’s use of the word anarchia is only one element in a 
constellation of terms that were characteristic of anti-democratic rheto-
ric. Thus, she refers to the Achaean army as an ochlos twice in very short 
order (lines 605 and 607). The word was a relatively common one and 
could be used to refer to any large group, whether it be of people or (for 
example) ships. But by the second half of the fifth century it had become 
laden with negative connotations, taking on the meaning of ‘mob’  36. 
Thucydides’ use of ochlos is revealing. While it is not necessarily a derog-
atory term for the historian  37, we regularly see him place ochlos in the 
mouths of speakers advancing critiques of democracy, such as Alcibiades 
when he is disavowing his democratic past at Sparta  38, and at moments 
when he wishes to stress the mob mentality of democratic bodies  39. 
Thucydides even suggests that the oligarchs of 411 were specifically con-
cerned about the mob-like qualities of an ochlos of sailors (VIII 72, 2):
δείσαντες­μή,­ὅπερ­ἐγένετο,­ναυτικὸς­ὄχλος­οὔτ’­αὐτὸς­μένειν­ἐν­τῷ­ὀλιγαρχικῷ­
κόσμῳ­ἐθέλῃ,­σφᾶς­τε­μὴ­ἐκεῖθεν­ἀρξαμένου­τοῦ­κακοῦ­μεταστήσωσιν.­
[The leaders of the coup] feared that an ochlos of sailors would not wish to 
remain under an oligarchic order, and that after starting trouble there [i.e. 
at sea] they would overthrow them; and this was precisely what happened.
In the minds of the oligarchs, the very existence of a large groups of 
sailors portends trouble (kakou), an outlook that is signaled, just as in 
 34 On this point, see Nakategawa 1995.
 35 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1274a, 12-15; 1304a, 21-24; and Ath. Pol. 27, 1.
 36 A secondary meaning of ὄχλος is, in fact, ‘annoyance’ or ‘trouble’, while deriva-
tives such as ὀχλέω, ὄχλησις, ὀχληρός, etc., are used almost exclusively to convey that 
negative meaning. All this suggests that, even though the first secure case of ὄχλος 
meaning ‘mob’ does not occur before the second half of the fifth century, the word 
already contained negative connotations at a much earlier time. 
 37 Saïd 2013, 202 and Lush 2015, 214 call it «pejorative», but my sense is that 
Thucydides uses it frequently enough in a neutral manner (e.g. I 80, 3 and III 87, 3) to 
suggest that it is not strictly derogatory.
 38 Thuc. VI 89, 5, on which more below, but see also Saïd 2013, 203.
 39 Thuc. IV 28, 3; VI 63, 2; VIII 86, 5. Cf. Hunter 1988, esp. 21-25. 
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Hecuba, by the use of the term ochlos to designate this group  40. Here, 
of course, the nature of the trouble is different – a (counter-)revolution 
rather than the defilement of a body – but it is the confluence of language 
and perspective that is most important. 
At other times, Thucydides leans towards the use of ochlos in order 
to differentiate masses from elites, and to cast the former in an unflatter-
ing light. For example, in response to Alcibiades’ claims that the Athe-
nians could win the assistance of the Persians if they were to abolish the 
democracy and institute an oligarchy, Thucydides reports the following 
reactions among the elite and non-elite members of the fleet at Samos 
(Thuc. VIII 48, 1-3):
πολλὰς­ἐλπίδας­εἶχον­αὐτοί­θ’­ἑαυτοῖς­οἱ­δυνατώτατοι­τῶν­πολιτῶν­τὰ­πράγ­
ματα,­οἵπερ­καὶ­ταλαιπωροῦνται­μάλιστα,­ἐς­ἑαυτοὺς­περιποιήσειν­καὶ­τῶν­
πο­λεμίων­ ἐπικρατήσειν­ […]­ καὶ­ ὁ­ μὲν­ ὄχλος,­ εἰ­ καί­ τι­ παραυτίκα­ ἤχθετο­
τοῖς­πρασ­σομένοις,­διὰ­τὸ­εὔπορον­τῆς­ἐλπίδος­τοῦ­παρὰ­βασιλέως­μισθοῦ­
ἡσύχαζεν·
The most powerful citizens themselves, who had suffered the most, had 
high hopes that they could put these matters into their own hands and 
prevail over their enemies […] and the ochlos, although at first it objected 
to the arrangements being made, ultimately was soothed by the hope of 
obtaining easy pay from the Persian King.
Here, ochlos is used to designate only the lower-class citizens who were 
not naturally inclined to support an oligarchy. And while the elites do 
not exactly emerge as beacons of ethical thought – their own political 
interests are obviously at stake – at least they are said to consider the 
broader implications on Athenian war policy. The ochlos, conversely, is 
moved only by the hope of a payout. Moreover, later in the passage, when 
Thucydides is presenting the views of allied states who would prefer for 
Athens to maintain a democracy, he refers to the masses not as an ochlos 
but as the de¯mos, a decidedly more neutral term. Ochlos thus appears to 
be a word that Thucydides gravitates towards when giving voice to anti-
democratic lines of thought. 
In fact, a similar phenomenon is visible in Euripides as well. In Sup­
pliants, performed around the same time as Hecuba, a famous debate 
takes place between Theseus, arguing on behalf of democracy, and a pro-
monarchy Theban herald who sharply attacks it. Once again, we find a 
contrast in the use of vocabulary. While Theseus advocates for Athenian 
 40 See also Saïd 2013, 203: «ὄχλος appears also twice in Book 8 [i.e. VIII 72, 2 
and VIII 92, 11], in passages expressing the viewpoint of the Four Hundred and their 
contempt for the ‘mob’».
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democracy because «the de¯mos rules by turns of annual successions», 
the Theban herald boasts that his city «is ruled by a single man, not by 
an ochlos»  41. As in Thucydides, we see an alternation between «ochlos» 
and the more neutral «de¯mos», and this time, the vocabulary exchange is 
performed in close proximity and by overtly partisan speakers. In other 
words, we see another selective use of ochlos, and we can thus begin to 
perceive a general tendency for anti-democratic speakers to lean towards 
the term when constructing their critiques. 
In this light, Hecuba’s use of ochlos to describe the Achaean army 
at Hec. 605 appears to be a loaded one. The fact that in the following 
instance (Hec. 607), she calls it an akolastos ochlos is even more sig-
nificant. Indeed, the use of akolasia and akolastos in reference to large 
groups – whether it be a de¯mos or an ochlos – appears to be a veritable 
hallmark of critiques of democracy  42. In Herodotus, for example, the 
only mention of akolasia occurs in the famous constitutional debate  43, 
and it is voiced by Megabyzus, who promotes the oligarchic mode of 
government (Her. III 81, 1-2): 
ὁμίλου­γὰρ­ἀχρηίου­οὐδέν­ἐστι­ἀξυνετώτερον­οὐδὲ­ὑβριστότερον.­καίτοι­τυ­
ράννου­ὕβριν­φεύγοντας­ἄνδρας­ἐς­δήμου­ἀκολάστου­ὕβριν­πεσεῖν­ἐστὶ­οὐ­δα­
μῶς­ἀνασχετόν.­
For nothing is more stupid and violent than a useless mob, and it would 
surely be utterly unbearable for men escaping the violence of a tyrant to 
succumb to the violence of an akolastos de¯mos. 
In order to argue in favor of oligarchy, Megabyzus must first rebut the 
previous speech in favor of democracy. Within this context, we learn 
that what is to be feared most is the hubris that results from the akolasia 
of the de¯mos. On the most basic level, these words not only belong to 
an oligarchic critique of democracy, they are meant to be recognized as 
such by Herodotus’ audience. The fact that Herodotus feels no need to 
have Megabyzus substantiate this claim suggests that the accusation is 
 41 Theseus at 406-407 (δῆμος δ’ ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει / ἐνιαυσίαισιν) and the 
Theban at 411 (ἑνὸς πρὸς ἀνδρός, οὐκ ὄχλῳ κρατύνεται). 
 42 Dover 1965, 90, defines akolasia as «the opposite of so¯phrosune¯ [and …] a char-
acteristic of democracy in the eyes of its critics», while Gregory 1999, 119 notes that in 
using it Hecuba is «voic[ing] the disdain of the undisciplined mob that was associated 
with the oligarchic point of view in fifth-century Athens».
 43 Even though this episode occurs in a Persian context, the discussion is steeped 
in language and ideas that «belong to the Greek intellectual world» (Evans 1981, 80). 
More recently, on the ‘Greekness’ of the arguments presented see Pelling 2002 (for a 
bibliography regarding this point see p. 125, n. 7).
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one that would come (or be seen as coming) naturally to the mouth of an 
oligarch  44. 
Thucydides’ Alcibiades, in his speech to the Spartans following his 
defection from Athens in 415, also resorts to an overt critique of democ-
racy  45, and he too does so by emphasizing the akolasia of the democratic 
body politic (Thuc. VI 89, 4-5):
τῆς­πόλεως­δημοκρατουμένης­τὰ­πολλὰ­ἀνάγκη­ἦν­τοῖς­παροῦσιν­ἕπεσθαι.­τῆς­
δὲ­ὑπαρχούσης­ἀκολασίας­ἐπειρώμεθα­μετριώτεροι­ἐς­τὰ­πολιτικὰ­εἶναι.­ἄλλοι­
δ’­ἦσαν­καὶ­ἐπὶ­τῶν­πάλαι­καὶ­νῦν­οἳ­ἐπὶ­τὰ­πονηρότερα­ἐξῆγον­τὸν­ὄχλον·­
οἵπερ­καὶ­ἐμὲ­ἐξήλασαν.­
When the city had a democratic government, it was necessary to adapt to 
the situation in most respects. But in our political activity we attempted 
to be more moderate than the prevailing intemperance [akolasia]. There 
were those in early times and present who steered the crowd [ochlos] in 
evil directions, the same men who banished me.  46
Working to explain his prior relationship to the Athenian democracy, 
Alcibiades claims that his efforts had been directed at moderating the 
«prevailing akolasia»; in other words, to help the de¯mos overcome a 
shortcoming. He then contrasts himself to his political rivals who had 
led the people in «evil directions». It is implicit that these «evil direc-
tions» are related to the people’s akolasia: either the «prevailing akolasia» 
makes the Athenians easy prey for leaders who wish to lead them down 
the wrong path, or the people themselves prefer that path, and leaders 
less capable than Alcibiades indulge them. It is significant that it is at 
this very moment that Alcibiades deploys the term ochlos  47, as we thus 
find further confirmation of its anti-democratic connotations. And like 
Megabyzus, Alcibiades provides no evidence or examples of democratic 
akolasia; the term itself and the context in which it appears are sufficient 
to make the point. Indeed, the notion that a democratic body was ako­
 44 See e.g. Pelling 2002, 142: «Megabyzus’ main function is to take out many of 
the more obvious points to make about democracy – its hybristic capriciousness, for 
instance – and get them out of the way».
 45 Alcibiades even goes so far as to declare democracy an «acknowledged folly» 
(VI 89, 6: ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας). On the rhetorical ends and means of Alcibiades’ 
proem, in which he mainly tries to qualify his relations with the Athenian democracy 
and to persuade the Spartans that they share common ground, see esp. Debnar 2001, 
204-207. 
 46 Tr. Lattimore 1999.
 47 At VI 89, 4, before embarking on his full-fledged critique of democracy, he had 
used de¯mos and then ple¯thos. On these contrasts in Alcibiades’ terminology, see Debnar 
2001, 206, n. 14.
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lastos simply appears to be a marker of anti-democratic rhetoric in the 
late fifth century.
To return to Hecuba’s fear of the anarchia of the Achaean army, it 
is clear that it must be seen in this rhetorical context. By calling it an 
anarchia nautike¯, she subtly but effectively links this disruptive behavior 
to the democratic nature of the Achaean army. The parallel declaration 
that the ochlos is akolastos confirms that her words hail from the realm of 
anti-democratic discourse. Finally, much like Alcibiades, Hecuba alludes 
to the possibility that the passions of the mob may be tempered when 
she orders Talthybius to tell the Argives to «keep the mob away» from 
Polyxena (Hec. 605). Hecuba sees the ochlos/de¯mos as tending towards 
akolasia, and a concomitant necessity that its leaders restrain them or 
be «more measured». Both she and Alcibiades depict the same social 
dynamic and in strikingly similar terms, and we can see that Hecuba 
firmly embeds her charge of anarchia in anti-democratic language. 
In the following episode, Hecuba moves beyond criticism of the 
democratic mass to a more comprehensive statement of hostility towards 
democracy. But after Agamemnon rejects her request to intercede against 
Polymestor on the grounds that he does not wish to be «reproached by 
the Achaeans» (Hec. 863: Ἀχαιοῖς εἰ διαβληθήσομαι), Hecuba returns to a 
(subtle) critique of democracy (Hec. 864-869):
οὐκ­ἔστι­θνητῶν­ὅστις­ἔστ’­ἐλεύθερος·
ἢ­χρημάτων­γὰρ­δοῦλός­ἐστιν­ἢ­τύχης
ἢ­πλῆθος­αὐτὸν­πόλεος­ἢ­νόμων­γραφαὶ
εἴργουσι­χρῆσθαι­μὴ­κατὰ­γνώμην­τρόποις.
ἐπεὶ­δὲ­ταρβεῖς­τῷ­τ’­ὄχλῳ­πλέον­νέμεις,
ἐγώ­σε­θήσω­τοῦδ’­ἐλεύθερον­φόβου.
There is no mortal who is free, 
for he is a slave either to money or to fate, 
or the city masses or written laws 
bar him from using his own good judgment.
But since you tremble and cater so much to the mob,
I shall set you free of this fear.
Scholars have certainly recognized the «aristocratic» tenor of Hecuba’s 
comments  48, but the extent to which Hecuba draws on oligarchic lines 
of thought has yet to be properly emphasized. On a general level, the 
argument that «no mortal is free» runs counter to the most basic of 
democratic ideals. And in order to defend her denial of freedom, Hecuba 
 48 Cf. e.g. Gregory 1999, 148.
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employs arguments  49 that were mobilized in the fifth century against the 
democratic attempt to monopolize the concept of eleutheria  50. In par-
ticular, the idea that an individual is not free because he is restrained by 
the masses mirrors Brasidas’ description of democracy as «enslaving the 
minority to everyone»  51. This reasoning was characteristic of the «oligar-
chic» perception that in a democracy, the elites, despite being «especially 
or even exclusively capable of governing […] were ‘enslaved’ by the will 
of the whole polis»  52.
Hecuba’s suggestion that the «written laws» function as an oppres-
sive force is, if anything, even more inflammatory. It is a deliberate jab 
at the democratic notion of isonomia, especially considering the fact that 
in one of the earliest extant defenses of democracy, Euripides himself 
stated that democratic poleis were based on these same «written laws»  53. 
Finally, by accusing Agamemnon of «cater[ing] so much to the mob», 
Hecuba essentially quotes (or vice-versa, perhaps) the Old Oligarch’s 
complaint that the Athenians «deal out more [pleon nemousi] to the 
poor, wretched, and common people» than to the upper classes  54. In 
short, just as she did when accusing the Achaeans of anarchic behavior, 
when she suggests that Agamemnon is powerless Hecuba draws deeply 
on concepts and language familiar from anti-democratic discourses. All 
this suggests that Euripides has molded her as a character whose per-
spective is openly hostile to democracy.
To summarize, in the first half of Hecuba we find ample evidence that 
the Achaean army is conceived of as a democratic body, and that Hecu-
ba’s outlook is fundamentally anti-democratic. Given that she couches 
her reference to «nautike¯ anarchia» in language that is thoroughly elitist, 
it is clear that her concept of anarchia is rooted in these sentiments. This 
 49 I set aside here Hecuba’s first two points (slavery to money and to fate) insofar 
as they appear to be universal (Gregory 1999, 148 calls them «private»), and as such do 
not belong to any single form of discourse. 
 50 On the democratic monopolization of the concept of ‘freedom’, see Raaflaub 
1983, esp. 520-524.
 51 Thuc. IV 86, 4: τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι δουλώσαιμι. This phrase has generated 
a variety of translations and some debate about its meaning – Raaflaub 1990, 38, for 
example, translates it as «enslavement […] of the few to all». For an overview, see 
Hornblower 1996, 281-282. 
 52 Raaflaub 1983, 525; for a similar argument, see Raaflaub 1990, 38.
 53 Cf. Eur. Supp. 433-437. Collard 1975, 441, points out that this is the only 
«explicit» mention of «[w]ritten law as a guarantee of democracy» in the fifth century, 
but he also notes that the «[l]ack of direct evidence for this idea earlier is probably an 
accident».
 54 Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1, 4: πλέον νέμουσι τοῖς πονηροῖς καὶ πένησι καὶ δημοτικοῖς ἢ 
τοῖς χρηστοῖς.
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does not mean that Euripides is constructing a critique of democracy. 
On the contrary, the Achaean army at no point confirms Hecuba’s sus-
picions – indeed their behavior belies them. What we do see, however, 
is that Euripides is able to easily fit the term anarchia into the context 
of anti-democratic speech. Were this anomalous, we might not give it 
another thought. But the fact that he returns, later in his career, to the 
same formulation, suggests that he is in fact drawing on critiques of 
democracy that were current in Athens.
4. anarchia at aulis
The other instance of Euripidean anarchia is, if anything, even bleaker 
in its exposition. As noted above, Iphigenia at Aulis creates a dramatic 
context that is strikingly similar to that of Hecuba. Once again, the action 
unfolds within an Achaean army camp whose processes are decidedly 
democratic – Agamemnon had campaigned for and been elected to his 
position at the head of the army (cf. IA 337-342)  55. And once again, the 
army’s anarchia is mentioned by an aristocratic woman (Clytemnestra) 
pleading on behalf of her (this time living) daughter. Clytemnestra’s sub-
scription to aristocratic values is perhaps less explicit than Hecuba’s, but 
it is nevertheless visible. Moreover, it is expressed within the context of 
considerable tensions between the aristocratic leaders and the mass of 
the army that are developed throughout the play. 
Brian Lush has recently addressed at length the «drama’s preoccu-
pation with the power and influence of the Achaean army», particularly 
through the lens of the words and actions of its «aristocratic leaders»  56. 
These issues run throughout the play. Twice, Agamemnon suggests that 
he has no choice but to sacrifice Iphigenia because if he refuses, the army 
will simply kill him and his family (cf. IA 528-535, 1264-1268). When 
Achilles actually does try to prevent the sacrifice, the Achaean army rises 
up against him and threatens to stone him to death (cf. IA 1345-1367, 
on which more below). The only Achaean elite who appears to have any 
control over the army is Odysseus, but even his authority is tenuous: we 
 55 The text of IA is notorious for the presence of numerous interpolations. Here 
I use as a guideline Diggle’s subdivision of the text into four categories according to 
his estimation of their probabilities of authenticity (see Diggle 1994, 358). Specifically, 
unless otherwise noted, all the passages discussed in this paper will belong to the two 
categories Diggle believes most likely to be authentic («fortasse Euripidei» and «for-
tasse non Euripidei»).
 56 Lush 2015.
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learn that he has been «chosen willingly» (IA 1364: αἱρεθεὶς ἑκών) to lead 
the army in their quest to drag off Iphigenia, a phrase that suggests he is, 
at least on some level, beholden to the army  57. Finally, the army is con-
stantly on the lips of the elites who appear on stage  58, with five references 
to the army as an ochlos, often in a manner that explicitly draws attention 
to its violent or repressive nature  59. Among these is one that is strikingly 
reminiscent of Hecuba, for like Hecuba before him, Menelaus rebukes 
Agamemnon because «one should not fear the army too much» (IA 517: 
οὔτοι­χρὴ­λίαν­ταρβεῖν­ὄχλον)  60. In short, throughout IA, anxieties about a 
democratic body politic abound.
As for Clytemnestra, her first act upon entering the stage is to bring 
up Achilles’ noble lineage, a notion she expresses with the same loaded 
adjective (esthlos) that Hecuba does  61. More compellingly, in her conver-
sation with Achilles she follows Menelaus (and by extension Hecuba) by 
criticizing Agamemnon’s excessive fear of the army (IA 1012: λίαν ταρβεῖ 
στρατόν – «he fears the army too much»). Finally, as the play draws to a 
close, Clytemnestra’s succinct judgment of the army’s attempt on Achil-
les’ life is that «the multitude is a terrible evil» (IA 1357: τὸ πολὺ γὰρ 
δει­νὸν κακόν). While she doesn’t engage in the same lengthy, aristocratic 
rhetoric that Hecuba does, her hostility towards the masses is nonethe-
less evident, and in formulating it, she too draws on the language and 
concepts of contemporary critiques of democracy.
Such are the contexts in which we must understand Clytemnestra’s 
attempt to persuade Achilles to intercede on Iphigenia’s behalf. Here, 
even though Clytemnestra’s presence among the Achaean ochlos is inher-
ently uncomfortable  62, she nevertheless feels the need to emphasize her 
plight by characterizing the army as nautikos and anarchos (IA 913-915):
 57 I follow in large part the conclusion in Lush 2015, 217 that «Odysseus has 
been granted his position […] so that he may help to ensure the accomplishment of the 
army’s demands». 
 58 Lush 2015, 214 notes that «words for mass, army, or the assembled Greek force 
occur in IA in greater abundance than in any other extant tragedy».
 59 As when Agamemnon claims to be a «slave» to the ochlos at IA 450, but see also 
517, 526, 1338.
 60 The formulation is not exactly the same as in Hec. 868 (ἐπεὶ δὲ ταρβεῖς τῷ τ’ 
ὄχλῳ πλέον νέμεις), but both share the tarbeo¯-ochlos combination, and the sentiment is 
analogous. 
 61 Cf. IA 609 and 625. Even though the authenticity of that passage has been 
(justifiably) doubted, it is likely that the interpolator was drawing on other aspects of 
Clytemnestra’s speech, and perhaps even appearance, that suggest this elite concern 
for lineage. Indeed, in the following episode she peppers Agamemnon with questions 
about Achilles’ genos (IA 695-710).
 62 IA 735: οὐ καλὸν ἐν ὄχλῳ σ’ ἐξομιλεῖσθαι στρατοῦ. 
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­ ἀφῖγμαι­δ’,­ὥσπερ­εἰσορᾷς,­γυνὴ
ναυτικὸν­στράτευμ’­ἄναρχον­κἀπὶ­τοῖς­κακοῖς­θρασύ,
χρήσιμον­δ’,­ὅταν­θέλωσιν.­
  As you see, I come as a woman
to a naval army that is anarchos and eager for wickedness,
though useful, whenever they wish to be.  63
These words and sentiments are, or course, remarkably similar to Hecu-
ba’s: each uses the coded «nautikos» to allude to the democratic make-up 
of the army; and each links the army’s ‘naval’ nature to its tendency for 
anarchia and bad behavior. Indeed, a direct comparison of these lines 
with Hec. 606-608 shows that both speakers use the terms strateuma, 
nautikos, and a pithy kakos-formulation to suggest the army’s predilec-
tion for villainy. And while Clytemnestra’s statement is less loaded than 
Hecuba’s – there is no mention of the ochlos akolastos – the play’s con-
stant ruminations about the Achaeans’ capacity for violence lurk in the 
background. Above all, what we see here, just as in Hecuba, is that the 
term anarchos is capable of concisely conveying the notion that a demo-
cratic mass is inherently threatening. 
Clytemnestra does grant a measure of redemption to this demo-
cratic army, stating that it can be useful (chre¯simon) when it wants to 
be. Despite the vaguely complimentary nature of the comment, this too 
ties into contemporary critiques of democracy. The Old Oligarch, for 
example, spends much of his essay showing how effective the Athenian 
de¯mos is at accomplishing its aims, whether those be the provision of 
public baths (2, 10) or the insistence that allies travel to Athens to settle 
legal disputes (1, 16-18). This dynamic holds true even in the field of 
international relations: if the Athenians make an alliance that proves 
inconvenient, «the de¯mos finds myriad excuses not to do anything they 
don’t want» (2, 17: προφάσεις μυρίας ἐξηύρηκε τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν ὅσα ἂν μὴ 
βού­λωνται). Describing events contemporary to IA, and with a perspec-
tive that is similarly hostile to democracy, Xenophon states that «the 
multitude shouted that it would be terrible if someone were to forbid 
the de¯mos from doing whatever it wanted»  64. Naturally, the will of the 
de¯mos prevails in his narration. The Old Oligarch and Xenophon thus 
 63 Diggle has doubts about the authenticity of 915 (he places it in the second-
lowest level of likely authenticity), but Kovacs 2003, 90-91 believes that all three of 
these lines belonged to the original performance. 
 64 Xen. Hell. I 7, 12: τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν 
ὃ ἂν βούληται. The context here is the debate, after the naval battle at Arginousae, over 
whether the de¯mos would be allowed to summarily prosecute and execute all their gen-
erals. 
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state at length what Clytemnestra articulates in half a line, and while the 
latter’s optimism does not match the cynicism of the first two, all three 
present the idea that a democratic mass will act effectively according to 
its desires.
Ultimately, and unlike in Hecuba, Clytemnestra’s fears about the 
army’s anarchic nature are realized. Achilles promises to intervene, but 
only if Clytemnestra cannot persuade Agamemnon to change his mind. 
And as the tragedy draws to a close, such an intervention becomes inevi-
table. When Achilles reappears, however, he reports that the Achaean 
soldiers have not been cooperative (IA 1346-1353):
Ach.: δείν’ ἐν Ἀργείοις βοᾶται Clyt.: τίς βοή; σήμαινέ μοι.
Ach.: ἀμφὶ σῆς παιδός­[…] Clyt.: πονηρῶν εἶπας οἰωνὸν λόγον.
Ach.: ὡς χρεὼν σφάξαι νιν. Clyt.: †κοὐδεὶς ἐναντία λέγει;†
Ach.: ἐς θόρυβον ἐγώ τιν’ αὐτὸς  Clyt.: τίν’, ὦ ξένε;
Ach.: ἤλυθον­[…]  
Ach.: σῶμα λευσθῆναι πέτροισι. Clyt.: μῶν κόρην σῴζων ἐμήν;
Ach.: αὐτὸ τοῦτο. Clyt.: τίς δ’ ἂν ἔτλη σώματος τοῦ σοῦ θιγεῖν;
Ach.: πάντες Ἕλληνες. Clyt.: στρατὸς δὲ Μυρμιδὼν οὔ σοι παρῆν;
Ach.: πρῶτος ἦν ἐκεῖνος ἐχθρός. 
Ach.: The Argives are shouting Clyt.: Shouting what? Tell me!
Ach.: terrible things.
Ach.: About your child. Clyt.: The words you speak are an omen 
 Clyt.: of evil.
Ach.: That they must slaughter her. Clyt.: And no one speaks against this?
Ach.: I myself risked it against Clyt.: Risked what?
Ach.: their uproar.
Ach.: Death by stoning. Clyt.: For defending my child?
Ach.: Exactly that. Clyt.: Who would dare lay their hands 
 Clyt.: on you?
Ach.: All the Greeks. Clyt.: And the Myrmidon army wasn’t 
 Clyt.: there for you?
Ach.: They were my first enemy. 
It is hard to imagine a more obvious and extreme example of ‘disobedi-
ence to officials’ – the type of «lawlessness» that Lane has identified as 
a marker of classical Greek anarchia  65. Indeed, although Achilles is their 
leader, even the Myrmidons have no intention of obeying him when he 
tries to prevent them from doing what they want. The fact they would 
go so far as to kill him in order to get their way confirms not only their 
willingness to disobey authority figures, but also Clytemnestra’s earlier 
suggestion that a «naval army» is «eager for wickedness».
 65 Lane 2017, 66.
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At the same time, in Achilles’ description of the army’s behavior we 
are reminded, yet again, of the army’s democratic makeup. To begin, 
the mechanism by which the army’s will is expressed – thorubos (the 
act of heckling or shouting down a public speaker) – was a practice that 
belonged primarily, if not exclusively, to democratic bodies  66. Even more 
striking is the specific threat to stone Achilles. The threat itself is not 
exceptional, as stoning was a commonly proposed sanction in the Greek 
literary tradition, especially in tragedy  67. But the situation in IA stands 
out because of the manner in which this course of action is decided: in 
nearly all other tragic instances in which a character risks being stoned, 
the sentence is delivered by a figure (or figures) in a legitimate position 
of power  68; here, conversely, the army appears to spontaneously decide 
to stone Achilles. This behavior is, of course, easily classified as mob vio-
lence (thus seeming to confirm the various references to IA’s army as an 
ochlos). More importantly, contemporary sources associate this type of 
stoning with democratic mobs in particular  69.
 66 This is implied by the fact that almost all fifth-century references to thorubos 
occur within the context of Athenian political practices. But confirmation of the fun-
damentally ‘democratic’ nature of thorubos may also be seen in its suppression during 
the oligarchic coups in Athens in 411 and 404, as is pointed out by Wallace 2004, 226. 
On the widespread practice of thorubos in democratic Athens in general, see Bers 1985; 
Tacon 2001; Balot 2004, 243-246; Wallace 2004; and Schwartzberg 2010, 461-465. 
Ober 1989, 325 goes so far as to claim that thorubos was a form of «collective iso¯goria». 
Contra see Hansen 1990, 350: «thorybos, heckling, was ideologically to be avoided 
[…] it was only a tolerated and not an intentional part of Athenian political discourse» 
(emphasis in original). Hansen may be correct that Ober’s argument for an «ideology» 
of thorubos is exaggerated, but his own argument suffers, in my view, from his implied 
insistence that there was a single ideology of «discourse» in Athens. This orthodoxy is 
belied by, among other things, the widespread existence of thorubos itself, particularly 
in the law-courts and the assembly. Even if an ideology of thorubos was not articulated 
as such, its widespread practice was certainly tolerated and probably even expected. 
Moreover, as is pointed out by Tuci 2013, 189-190, thorubic disruptions seem to have 
been used in an organized and intentional manner in order to influence votes within the 
assembly, a practice that suggests a broad recognition of the role that thorubos played in 
democratic political processes. 
 67 On the literary tradition more generally, see esp. Steiner 1995. 
 68 Either by a tribunal, as in Eur. Or. 49-50, or by a group’s leader or leaders, as 
in Eur. Ion 1111-1112; Bacch. 355-357; Soph. Ant. 36; Ajax 251-255. The only excep-
tions are in Euripides’ IT 240-339, in which a group of shepherds uses stones to attack 
Orestes and Pylades for killing their livestock, though this seems less an instance of 
‘justice’ being sought through stoning than a group of people using the only weapons at 
their disposal to attack armed men; and Aesch. Ag. 1616, in which the chorus suggests 
that Aegisthus will eventually be stoned by the people of Argos. 
 69 Gras 1984, 84-85 even claims that stoning was an «expression of democracy». 
Gras is followed, and at greater length, by Forsdyke 2008.
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To be clear, stoning was not a common practice in archaic and classi-
cal Greece. It seems to have been deployed only rarely, and usually against 
deposed tyrants or army leaders who ran afoul of their soldiers  70. We are 
clearly dealing with the latter here, and one instance of stoning that Thucy-
dides describes corresponds neatly to the situation in IA. In 418, contin-
gents of Spartans and Argives (and their respective allies) had gathered in 
preparation for what would surely have been a memorable encounter  71. 
Before the fighting could begin, the Spartan king Agis and the Argive gen-
eral Thrasylus brokered a truce, but they did so without consulting their 
armies or allies. The soldiers on both sides were unhappy with the accord, 
not least because it was struck without their input. The situation is thus 
akin to that which we see at Aulis, where Achilles faces the wrath of the 
Achaeans for single-handedly trying to stop the war against Troy. 
At this point, however, Thucydides’ account presents a notable con-
trast in the reactions of the Spartans and Argives (Thuc. V 60, 2; 4-6)  72:
οἱ­δὲ­Λακεδαιμόνιοι­καὶ­οἱ­ξύμμαχοι­εἵποντο­μὲν­ὡς­ἡγεῖτο­διὰ­τὸν­νόμον,­ἐν­
αἰτίᾳ­δ’­εἶχον­κατ’­ἀλλήλους­πολλῇ­τὸν­Ἆγιν­[…]­τὸ­μὲν­οὖν­στρατόπεδον­οὕτως­
ἐν­αἰτίᾳ­ἔχοντες­τὸν­Ἆγιν­ἀνεχώρουν­τε­καὶ­διελύθησαν­ἐπ’­οἴκου­ἕκαστοι,­
Ἀργεῖοι­δὲ­καὶ­αὐτοὶ­ἔτι­ἐν­πολλῷ­πλέονι­αἰτίᾳ­εἶχον­τοὺς­σπεισαμένους­ἄνευ­
τοῦ­πλήθους­[…]­τόν­τε­Θράσυλον­ἀναχωρήσαντες­ἐν­τῷ­Χαράδρῳ,­οὗπερ­τὰς­
ἀπὸ­στρατείας­δίκας­πρὶν­ἐσιέναι­κρίνουσιν,­ἤρξαντο­λεύειν.­ὁ­δὲ­καταφυγὼν­
ἐπὶ­τὸν­βωμὸν­περιγίγνεται·­τὰ­μέντοι­χρήματα­ἐδήμευσαν­αὐτοῦ.
The Spartans and their allies followed [Agis’] lead out of respect for 
the law, but amongst themselves they blamed him loudly [for denying 
them certain victory …] the army therefore withdrew blaming Agis, and 
returned to their respective homes. The Argives, on the other hand, were 
even louder in blaming those who had made the truce without consult-
ing the people […] and when they had withdrawn they began to stone 
[Thrasylus] in the Charadrus, the very place they hold military trials 
before entering the city. He survived by fleeing to the altar; they, however, 
confiscated his property.  73
The differences in the behaviors of the two armies is highlighted by the 
fact that both sides consider their leaders to be «responsible» (en aitiai) 
 70 Gras 1984, 83-85. 
 71 Thucydides calls the Spartan army «the finest Hellenic army that had ever been 
assembled» (V 60, 3).
 72 The segments I have deleted from the Thucydidean passage merely relate the 
reasons the armies were upset (namely that each side fancied its chances). A second 
account of this incident is found in Diod. XII 78, 5-6, and it falls along the general lines 
of Thucydides’ narration.
 73 I am indebted to Richard Crawley’s translation for a number of these turns of 
phrase.
Erga -Logoi – 7 (2019) 1
https://www.ledonline.it/Erga-Logoi - Online ISSN 2282-3212 - Print ISSN 2280-9678 
Euripides and the Origins of Democratic «Anarchia»
77
for costing them the battle. The Spartans and their allies return to their 
cities unhappy, but they do not rebel against or otherwise punish Agis  74. 
The Argives, on the other hand, look at Thrasylus’ action as a betrayal 
of their collective will – he acted «aneu tou ple¯thous» – and they react 
with incomparably greater severity by attempting to stone their leader to 
death. 
The fact that this stoning took place in the normal venue for military 
trials lends a veneer of legitimacy to the Argives’ actions, but reading 
between the lines we see that Thucydides suggests otherwise. To begin, 
he specifically emphasizes that the Spartans had maintained their collec-
tive cool «out of respect for the law»; no such explanation is supplied 
for the Argives’ reaction, and we may thus infer that Thucydides sees 
the stoning as a deviation from legal standards. Moreover, had this ston-
ing actually been mandated by the military tribunal (such as it may have 
been), it is unlikely that fleeing to an altar would have been sufficient to 
guarantee Thrasylus’ long-term survival. In fact, Diodorus tells us that it 
was not the altar that saved him, but a great deal of supplication (Diod. 
XII 78, 5: πολλῆς δεήσεως), and Forsdyke correctly points out that this 
amounts to an «emotional appeal […] rather than a formal defence»  75. 
This in turn suggests that neither the stoning nor the pardon occurred 
within the context of a legal procedure. Finally, the fact that his prop-
erty was subsequently confiscated implies that an actual legal ruling was 
made, and it regarded this confiscation. As such, the stoning of Thrasylus 
appears to be an example of spontaneous and extra-legal activity, one 
that is enacted by an army that has little regard for the law.
Looking back to Aulis, Achilles’ near-stoning experience is analo-
gous in a few ways  76: it is attempted by a democratic military body; it is a 
backlash against a leader’s unilateral decision not to go to war; and it falls 
well outside the bounds of any legal proceeding. In short, it is an act of 
anarchia, a refusal to obey one’s leaders or to follow institutional guide-
lines. All this is not to say that Euripides modeled events at Aulis after 
those in Argos. Rather, we should see that both Thucydides and Euripi-
des represent stoning as an extraordinary measure that is undertaken by 
 74 Diodorus (XII 78, 6) says that the Spartans took legal action against Agis, but 
that he escaped punishment by promising to make up for his error.
 75 Forsdyke 2008, 30.
 76 Another intriguing parallel, which for the sake of space I do not discuss here, 
occurred some decades earlier during the wars against Persia: when an Athenian by the 
name of Lycides suggested that they bring terms of surrender offered by the Persians 
before the de¯mos for consideration, he and his family were promptly stoned to death by 
his compatriots. On this episode, see esp. Her. IX 4-5, and Rosivach 1987.
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a specific type of mob – one that is drawn from a democratic army. It is 
implicit in both cases that such behavior is not admirable, or even accept-
able, but Clytemnestra’s reaction to Achilles’ narration is poignant: «the 
multitude is a terrible evil» (IA 1357: τὸ πολὺ γὰρ δεινὸν κακόν). Rather 
than condemn the action of this specific mob, Clytemnestra instead 
denounces the masses in general, as if this type of anarchic behavior is 
exactly what is to be expected.  
5. conclusions
We have seen a series of remarkable confluences that exist in Euripides’ 
two uses of anarch- root terms. Both Hecuba and Clytemnestra level 
charges of anarchic behavior against an Achaean army that is portrayed 
as a democratic mass. Both use similar sets of vocabulary – on top of 
anarchia/anarchos we see the noun strateuma and the adjective nautikos 
to describe the army, and the verb tarbeo­ to describe Agamemnon’s rela-
tionship to the army. Each character suggests that as a result of this pen-
chant for anarchia, the army is capable of great acts of violence. Above 
all, the accusations of anarchia are delivered within contexts that recall 
classical critiques of democracy: Hecuba’s use of anarchia falls within a 
constellation of terms with strong connections to oligarchic rhetoric, and 
throughout the play we see that her perspective is suffused with both 
aristocratic and anti-democratic ideologies; Clytemnestra’s language is 
less overtly steeped in anti-democratic discourses, but she too is critical 
of the masses (and Agamemnon’s relation to them), and her outlook is of 
a piece with the anti-democratic language and concepts that reverberate 
throughout IA. 
Significantly, both Hecuba and Clytemnestra are able to express 
their concerns about the Achaeans’ anarchia with little further elabora-
tion: both women limit themselves to specifying the type of body that 
they are talking about (a ‘naval’ army; an akolastos ochlos), and a general 
statement about the bad (kakos) behavior that can be expected from 
such bodies. It thus appears that no other information is necessary to 
convey to the audience just what type of concerns they have, or why; 
the term anarchia in conjunction with the bad behavior of a democratic 
body suffices. But in fact, we might say that this other information is 
supplied by the general characterization that Euripides gives his speak-
ers: Hecuba and Clytemnestra do not need to define what they mean 
by the anarchia of a naval army because their general hostility towards 
democratic bodies does so for them. All of this suggests that Euripides 
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is not so much developing an original meaning of anarchia, but that he 
is drawing on the thought and language of contemporary critiques of 
democracy.
At this point, we might look back to Aeschylus, who provides the 
only earlier uses of the language of anarchy with any possible links to 
democracy, and an illuminating contrast to Euripides. As mentioned 
above, it has been speculated that two Aeschylean uses of anarchia/anar­
chos are subtle references to radical democratic reforms that were being 
discussed at the time of the Oresteia (458): the δημόθρους ἀναρχία about 
which Clytemnestra pretends to fret in Agamemnon, and the anarchos 
constitution about which Athena warns in Eumenides. While these con-
nections cannot, I believe, be confirmed, it is nevertheless meaningful 
that Aeschylus uses the language of anarchia in contexts that are explic-
itly political, which is to say in discussions that concern the order and 
functioning of a theoretical polis. 
What Aeschylus does not do, however, is embed these anarch-terms 
within the language and ideas of oligarchic discourse, nor indeed within 
any consistent type of discourse. In fact, the two references are deliv-
ered in two very different contexts, and by two very different speakers: 
Clytemnestra, speaking as a tyrant who uses the concept of anarchia to 
describe her specious fear of a popular uprising against her rule; and 
Athena, who recommends a constitutional middle ground between 
‘anarchy’ and tyranny. We can thus hypothesize that, in Aeschylus’ time, 
anarchia was a catch-all term that referred to a (negative) situation of 
political instability or violence, but that it had not yet acquired specific 
associations with one political order or another. 
As for Euripides, we see that in the only two instances in which he 
uses anarch-terms, he places them in the mouths of oligarchic speakers, 
within contexts in which anti-democratic concepts are advanced, and at 
moments in which a concise and overt critique of democratic bodies is 
provided. In other words, by the time he is writing Hecuba, it was natural 
to turn to anarchia in the midst of an oligarchic discourse, and likely that 
many members of the audience would understand what was meant by 
the term, and its discursive source. All this suggests that at some point 
between the Oresteia and Hecuba, that is during the third quarter of the 
fifth century, the concept of democratic anarchia became a part of main-
stream, oligarchic critiques of democracy.
 Jonah f. radding 
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